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I. INTRODUCTION 
Critical space-applications require minimal malfunction, high percentages of availability, and virtually no risk of device 
damage during mission deployment. Because it has been shown that electronic devices are susceptible to space environment 
ionizing particles (radiation effects) [1-3], significant effort is given to device radiation hardness assurance. 
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are widely used in critical space-flight applications as controllers, data-flow 
infrastructure, and data processors. Due to their principal roles throughout systems, the integrity of FPGA operation is 
instrumental to mission success. 
In 2012, NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) developed a robust test and analysis (hardness assurance) 
methodology for FPGA component evaluation and SEE data application [4]. Since 2012, FPGA circuit complexity has 
increased exponentially. With the combination of complexity management and years of lessons learned material, the 
documentation is currently being updated. This manuscript highlights a select portion of the guideline updates. 
II. OVERVIEW OF UPDATES 
The following are updated or new subjects added to the NEPP FPGA SEE Test Guidelines manual: academic- versus 
mission-specific device evaluation, single event latch-up (SEL) test and analysis, SEE response visibility enhancement during 
radiation testing, mitigation evaluation (embedded and user-implemented), unreliable design and its effects to SEE data, 
testing flushable architectures versus non-flushable architectures, intellectual property core (IP Core) test and evaluation 
(addresses embedded and user-inserted), heavy-ion energy and linear energy transfer (LET) selection, proton versus heavy-
ion testing, fault injection, mean fluence to failure analysis, and mission specific system-level single event upset (SEU) 
response prediction. 
Most sections within the guidelines manual provide information regarding best practices for test structure and test system 
development. The scope of this manual addresses academic- versus mission-specific device evaluation and visibility 
enhancement in IP Core testing. 
III. ACADEMIC- VERSUS MISSION-SPECIFIC DEVICE EVALUATION 
 
Currently, radiation beam accessibility for device sensitivity testing is limited; hence it is important to carefully define 
goals and means for achievement. As a part of goal identification, a distinction should be made regarding the purpose of 
radiation-susceptibility data collection: (a) academic study for component-level SEE sensitivity; or (b) extrapolation for 
mission survivability predictions.  
A. Academic Component-Level Studies 
Conventionally, shift registers are used for academic component-level SEE analysis. Shift registers are implemented using 
flip-flops (DFFs), combinatorial logic, and global routes (clocks and resets). They are commonly selected as test structures 
because of the following: 
• The study is geared to analyze flip-flop (DFF) sensitivity. 
• Test structures are relatively easy to create and fabricate. 
• The full state space is visible to the test system; hence data collection is easily comprehensible. 
 
Figure 1: Shift Register SEU cross sections with design 
parameter variation [5]. 
 
 
Figure 2: Statistical variation of SEU data across the number of 
tests based on the number of DFFs in the shift register test 
structures. All test parameters are held constant except for the 
number of DFFs. 
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 Shift registers can be tested with a range of parameters: operational frequency, number of combinatorial logic gates 
between stages, and input data patterns. It is important to note that parameter variation can significantly impact SEU data. 
Figure 1 illustrates shift register SEU data obtained during heavy-ion testing in the form of SEU cross sections 
(SEUerrors/(DFF(particle-fluence/cm2))). Figure 1 shows that parameter selection can cause susceptibility data to vary with 
orders of magnitude. If the full range of parameters is not explored, data interpretation can be misleading. As a clarification, 
if test parameters are overlooked or unobtainable during test, then component susceptibility reporting can cause incorrect 
design implementations; and hence can lead to catastrophic events. 
Statistics should be taken into account during testing. If the test structure contains a small number of repeatable 
components, then it is up to the investigator to increase the number of tests in order to decrease statistical variation between 
data. Figure 2 illustrates statistical variation based off of repeatable test components versus number of tests performed. 
A benefit of academic component-level testing is that it gives the investigator an insight into individual component 
sensitivity sans masking-effects. However, it is imperative that results be correctly interpreted and extrapolated. As an 
example, design topology and design complexity can cause component susceptibility to either decrease (due to de-rating) or 
increase (due to poor design decisions). As a result, a significant amount of research targets extrapolation of data into 
synchronous design topologies and smart selection of mitigation strategies per device susceptibility. Although work is being 
done to better perform data extrapolation, discrepancies and limitations currently exist. In response, if the goal is to determine 
mission-specific survivability, a new approach is being developed under the NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) 
program [6]. This approach incorporates combining academic component-level SEU testing and mission-specific design SEU 
testing. 
B. Mission-Specific Evaluation 
In order to calculate mission survivability predictions, it is best to analyze systems that closely resemble those that will be 
employed in the mission. This requires the system-under-test have comparable complexity and maintain proper design 
topology. As an example, due to reliability, most missions strictly require synchronous design topology be implemented 
throughout all digital circuits. Hence, in order to obtain representative data, it is imperative that systems-under-test also 
strictly use synchronous design topology.  
The primary concern for SEU testing is that mission-specific applications are complex systems that make SEU data 
collection challenging. This is mostly because visibility into system circuitry and state space traversal are minimized per SEE 
test. As a result, data obtained during radiation testing can be misrepresentative. Consequently the susceptibility data might 
not correctly characterize SEU response per mission specific operational modes, and could hence lead to poor (and perhaps 
catastrophic) design implementations.  
The following are a few methods that have been developed to enhance SEU data collection: (1) investigate a variety of test 
structures that vary in complexity; (2) vary operational frequency and input patterns; (3) force a variety of state-space 
traversal schemes per test; (4) perform as many tests as possible; (4) and increase visibility of internal circuits and their 
contributions to susceptibility. The intent of variation is to study trends of SEU responses across a variety of parameters, 
designs, and state traversal. These actions help to identify dominant sources of error and better extrapolate data to mission-
specific systems. 
IV. MISSION-SPECIFIC SURVIVABILITY PREDICTION 
The current method for SEU survivability prediction is based off of transistor-level energy deposition and extrapolation 
[7]. As previously mentioned, NEPP is currently developing a novel methodology for calculating mission survivability 
through potential single events. The new strategy uses a top-down system-level approach using empirical SEU data and 
classical reliability models [8]. An interesting aspect of the methodology is that classical reliability models are transformed 
from the time domain to the particle fluence (Φ) domain. In addition, the system level approach acknowledges the 
nonhomogeneous nature of FPGA transistors by moving away from performing transistor level energy deposition 
calculations. Alternatively, the method relies on the strength of the SEU empirical data obtained by testing systems that 
represent mission-specific requirements. 
The following is a synopsis of the proposed methodology: 
• Create a histogram of particle flux (Φ for a given time window) versus LET. The time window and fluence per 
LET is selected from mission requirements. An example histogram for a 10-minute required window of operation 
is illustrated in Figure 3.  
• Obtain SEU data and calculate mean-fluence-to-failure (MFTF) per LET. LETs used in this calculation are the 
effective LETs selected during radiation testing.  
• Graph reliability with respect to particle fluence (R(Φ)= e-Φ/MFTF) for each histogram bin [6][8]. Although each bin 
contains a range of LETs, the selected MFTF for the reliability calculation is and upper-bound; i.e., the selected 
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MFTF corresponds to the highest LET within the bin under investigation. 
 
 
Figure 3: Environment Data: Flux versus LET Histogram for A 10-minute Window. Target environment is Geosynchronous Equatorial Orbit 
(GEO) with 100-mils shielding. Bin boundaries are selected based off of effective LET values used during SEU testing. 
 
V. VISIBILITY ENHANCEMENT IN IP CORE TESTING 
 
IP Core test and analysis (T&A) is challenging because the 
IP are generally considered black-boxes of complex circuitry. Consequently, visibility of internal sensitivity is minimal.  
IP Cores are implemented in a variety of methods: embedded in FPGA fabric (hard IP), user-inserted hardware description 
language (HDL), user-inserted gate-level netlist (GLN), or user-inserted encrypted circuitry. Embedded and encrypted IP 
Core circuitry are not visibility to the user. Alternatively, HDL and GLN user-inserted IP cores are visible. The challenge is, 
although visible, IP Core circuitry can be too complex to parse or comprehend. 
One method of enhancing visibility during SEE testing is to parse HDL and GLN IP Cores, collect internal-vital signals, 
send the signals to a tester, and watchdog the signals for correct operation. A couple of benefits with applying this 
enhancement are: SEU data can be better attributed to component sensitivities; and SEU cross sections can be more 
accurately calculated. This level of visibility into embedded microprocessors for SEU testing is a novel approach . Extracting 
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Figure 4: Increasing visibility for a microprocessor IP Core during 
SEU testing. 
 
 
Figure 5: Heavy-ion SEU data for microprocessor IP Core. Two 
architectures were tested: with cache and without cache. Cache 
implementation had no fault tolerance.  
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internal-vital signals for SEU testing is a difficult process, however, it is feasible and should be performed. 
As a test case, NEPP tested an embedded microprocessor IP Core in a Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA. Two microprocessor 
architectures were analyzed: (1) IP Core instantiation with cache (no fault tolerance) and (2) IP Core instantiation without 
cache. The intent was to evaluate the sensitivity of IP Core cache circuitry. 
The core was parsed in order to extract critical internal microprocessor signals. A portion of the signals is depicted in 
Figure 4. As previously described, the signals were fed to a customized tester and watchdogs were developed based off of 
expected signal behavior. Watchdog violations were time-stamped, packaged, and sent to a host PC for SEU data collection.  
Figure 5 illustrates the microprocessor IP Core calculated SEU cross sections obtained from heavy-ion testing. As a result 
from implementing test enhancements, data was compartmentalized based off of component SEU responses and sensitivity 
dominance could be analyzed. The mission used the SEU data to determine components that require mitigation (based on 
mission requirements) and which type of mitigation would fulfill design specifications. 
VI. SUMMARY 
The evolution of technology is causing potential complexity of FPGA designs to grow rapidly. This has impacted SEU test 
and analysis and SEU data extrapolation for mission survivability predictions. In order to keep up with technological 
advancements, the NEPP FPGA test guidelines manual is currently being updated. This document provides a synopsis of 
updates and new material. 
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